The first New York City Asteroids Club Dinner
[Cross posted from CivilPolitics.org]
The Asteroids Club is any group of people with diverging political views who gather not to debate, but to listen to the other side explain why it is concerned about certain threats. The metaphor is meant to capture the fact that there are many threats coming at the United States–like asteroids scheduled for direct hits—yet each side of the political spectrum focuses on a few of them and ignores or discounts the asteroids that most worry the other side. As John Stuart Mill said in 1840: “in almost every one of the leading controversies… both sides were in the right in what they affirmed, though in the wrong in what they denied.” The Asteroids Club is a novel format for bringing people together, over a meal, for a discussion in which each side helps the other to see more clearly. The format has been developed by The Village Square, in Tallahassee Florida.
The Nathan Cummings Foundation hosted the first New York City Asteroids Club dinner on February 26, 2014, in the home of its president, Simon Greer. The foundation is in the process of updating its research and funding portfolios, and its leaders were interested in learning more about the issues of income inequality and the causes of poverty. They were also interested in developing relationships with experts from diverse perspectives who could help them understand these complex topics. Simon and I therefore chose the two asteroids of rising income inequality (a topic of greater concern on the left), and declining rates of marriage and family stability (a topic of greater concern on the right).
This report is intended to be useful for anyone interested in hosting future dinners, or in bridging the political divide more generally. However, we note that we decided to invite experts from right and left to the first dinner, rather than ordinary people, to maximize the degree to which we could learn about the best thinking and research on these topics. This dinner may therefore not be representative of what will happen if the Asteroids Club format is rolled out and used widely by civic groups across the nation.
Preparing For the Dinner
We ran the dinner using the Chatham House rule, which says that participants are free to write about the event, but cannot reveal the identities or affiliations of the speakers. So we will simply say that we invited two very prominent and well-respected journalists, one clearly identified with liberalism, one with conservatism. We asked these two co-hosts to suggest additional people they wanted on their “team.” (We had hoped to avoid the terms “team” or “side,” but it was hard to do so.) These two co-hosts then nominated several other experts, and took a few suggestions from Simon and me about experts we know on both sides. All 10 people who were invited accepted the invitation. The final dinner was attended by 18 people: 6 liberals, 6 conservatives, Simon and me (who served as co-hosts), and four observers affiliated with the foundation. The expertise in the room was extraordinary, including journalists, economists, activists, and people with experience in government and policy-making.
Two weeks before the dinner, we assembled a list of readings nominated by the participants and posted them all in a google document that we used to share information and coordinate the evening. Because these prominent participants were all extremely busy, we did not push for them to do much preparation beforehand, although we did encourage them to read one or two articles from the other side, and to watch my TED talk that introduced the idea of the asteroids club.
The Dinner
The evening began at 7:30 with drinks, hors d’oeuvres, and unstructured socializing, which was quite cross-partisan. At 8:00 the two teams convened separately to go over final plans for their presentation. (In retrospect we should have encouraged the two teams to do more of this online, before arriving at the dinner). Around 8:30 everyone moved into the dining room and sat in seats that had been assigned to ensure a good mix of people at each of the two long tables. Simon welcomed everyone to his home and presented the Hebrew conception of two kinds of argument: machloket l’shem shamayim – argument that is for the sake of heaven which is intended to better discern truth and move the world forward, and 2) machloket she’lo l’shem shamayim – an argument that is not for the sake of heaven, but is just for the sake of itself or for the sake of being controversial. Argument in pursuit of truth is considered sacred in the Jewish tradition.
I then explained the history of the Asteroids Club format, and went over the groundrules, including the Chatham house rule, the exact schedule, and the role that I would play as timekeeper and moderator. Each of the participants then offered a 1-minute introduction of him- or herself. We then served ourselves dinner from the buffet, and began the structured discussion. The schedule that we intended to follow was this:
9:00 begin Asteroid #1: rising inequality, liberal side presents
–15 minutes to describe the threat; why this matters, why it’s urgent….During this time, the listening side gets to ask a few brief elaborative questions, but hold argumentative questions for the next step.
–5 minutes for “telescope” time — conservatives ask critical questions, request more info, challenge assumptions.
9:20 begin Asteroid #2 family breakdown, conservative side presents
–15 minutes to describe the threat; why this matters, why it’s urgent…. During this time, the listening side gets to ask a few brief elaborative questions, but hold argumentative questions for the next step.
–5 minutes for “telescope” time — liberals ask critical questions, request more info, challenge assumptions.
9:40: dessert served, short break
9:45 Integrative discussion, 20 min.
–10 min: Return to Asteroid #1: Inequality. Go deeper: what does the liberal side most want to change, address, or at least have understood (taking into account family breakdown)
–10 min: Return to Asteroid #2: Family Breakdown: Go deeper: what does the conservative side most want to change, address, or at least have understood? (taking into account rising inequality)
10:05 Concluding discussion and resolutions.
10:30: End of formal discussion, take closing survey.
The schedule we actually followed was close to this, but because we were running behind and because there was clearly a surprising amount of agreement on what aspects of poverty were of great concern, I decided to merge the two parts of the integrative discussion into a single discussion of what really matters – what issues either side had raised that seemed to elicit at least some assent from the other side.
In general there was bipartisan agreement that income inequality has been rising in recent decades, although there was NOT bipartisan agreement that rising inequality itself was a problem that needed to be addressed. There was, however, bipartisan (though not necessarily unanimous) agreement that the following issues are concerns or problems, and that we would be a better country if we could address them:
- Dignity, and the indignities disproportionately suffered by the poor
- Distrust of government and democracy
- Waste: the financial squeeze and inefficiency caused by “arms races” as people spend more money to attain “positional goods” such as a home in a good school district.
- Lack of opportunity for large segments of society; The waste of human potential among the poor.
- Declining motivation and economic dynamism – which can be stimulated by moderate degrees of inequality (this point was noted by a liberal)
- Abuses of power, which becomes easier for those with a lot of money
- Separateness – having communities that are cut off from the mainstream of society; having low social trust and cohesion.
In general there WAS bipartisan agreement that marriage rates and family stability have declined in recent decades. There WAS bipartisan agreement that these trends are bad for society, and that it would be good if we could find ways of reversing the trends. There was a very high degree of bipartisan concern about poverty, especially for its pernicious effects on children. There was also a consensus that the people who suffer most from these trends are single mothers (who bear the main costs and stresses of raising children under often adverse circumstances) and their sons. Daughters suffer too, of course, but there was consensus that boys’ outcomes are more adversely affected by the absence of a father, and these adverse outcomes then set up a feedback loop for the next generation in which there are way too few stable, employed, and marriageable young men who could break the cycle of father-absence.
The Post-Dinner Assessment
We are working with my colleagues at CivilPolitics.org to develop assessment tools that can be used by any organization running any kind of civility-enhancing event. For future events, we will send all participants a link to a web-based survey a few days before the event, then pass out a paper questionnaire at the conclusion of the event, then send out a web-based followup survey a week after the event, to assess the effects of the event on attitudes about the asteroids, and about the people on the other side. For this first dinner, with 12 super-busy people, we only obtained four responses to the first web survey. (You can see that first survey here. Future versions will be much more extensive.) We therefore decided to focus our efforts on obtaining measures of the key variables at the conclusion of the evening. Did people come to see the asteroid presented by the other side as a clearer or more pressing threat than they had before the dinner? That is the central goal of an Asteroids Club dinner.
We collected responses from all 6 liberals and from 5 of the conservatives. For each asteroid, we asked participants whether their views had changed regarding both the PACE of the threat and the SEVERITY of the threat. For example, here is the exact text of one of the four main questions:
How has tonight’s discussion influenced your beliefs about the severity of the problem of income inequality for the USA?
___I now see it as a much less severe problem than I did a week ago
___I now see it as a slightly less severe problem than I did a week ago
___The discussion did not influence my beliefs in either direction
___I now see it as a slightly more severe problem than I did a week ago
___I now see it as a much more severe problem than I did a week ago
The graph below shows the results. Let’s start with family decline. The liberals (shown on the left half) DID move in the desired direction. They now see it as a more rapidly approaching threat (gold bar, 4 moved), and a more severe threat (purple bar, 5 moved). The conservatives did not really move on family decline, nor did we expect them to. (The gold bar doesn’t even show because nobody moved.)
On inequality, the story was quite different. No conservative moved at all on the speed of the change (which is why the blue bar does not show), and the only movement on severity came from a single conservative who said that he/she now sees the problem as “slightly less severe” than before. (The liberals also showed no movement on inequality, except for a single participant who said “slightly more severe” than before.)
What can we make of this pattern? It appears that the asteroids club format worked for the family decline asteroid. The conservatives presented the asteroid, the liberals listened, and then came to see it as a greater threat. This is very encouraging.
But it is harder to know how to interpret the results on the inequality asteroid. The lack of movement could have resulted because A) the liberal team made a weaker case about inequality than the conservatives had for family decline, or B) the conservatives were less open-minded and willing to listen, or C) the facts about inequality and its harms are truly more ambiguous and contestable than they are for the family decline asteroid. My conclusion from the background reading, and from the conversation during the dinner, is that C is true and is at least part of the explanation.
We also asked: “Compared to other discussions about policy and politics you’ve had in politically ‘mixed company,’ how enjoyable was this ‘asteroids club’ format?” We offered 5 choices, ranging from “much less enjoyable” (scored as -2) to “much more enjoyable” (scored at +2). Six respondents said “much more enjoyable,” one said “about the same,” and four said “slightly more enjoyable.” There was no significant difference between the liberals and conservatives, which is quite encouraging
Conclusions and advice for future Asteroids Club dinners:
Based on the data above, and on comments made by participants after the dinner, I draw the following conclusions and lessons:
1) The format is enjoyable and promotes civil interaction. Sharing a meal in a private home seems to have made people particularly polite and open.
2) It is difficult to do two asteroids in a single 2 hour discussion. There are advantages to doing two – it led to a sense of balance and fairness. But at least 3 hours of discussion would have been needed to cover both.
3) Relationships matter, and it takes time to get to know each other and develop trust. Ideally, asteroids clubs will be true clubs, with a stable membership that meets every month or two.
4) The exact instructions for each part of the evening matter. More work is needed, drawing from experts in negotiation and facilitated discussion, on how to optimize the integrative discussion and conclusion.
5) More “warmup” exercises could be tried. We kept this evening fairly direct and cerebral – focused on the ideas and research. But future events could begin with more activities to build trust and cohesion, such as singing the National Anthem, or doing introductions in a much more personal way, or pairing off in bipartisan teams for short initial discussions, and then having participants report to the group by introducing their partner and his/her main concerns.
The bottom line is that we created a novel social situation which called for openness, trust, and collaborative thinking, and the participants rose to the occasion. There was no partisan sniping and not a shred of hostility. People sometimes made points that supported the other side. Many on both sides expressed a desire to continue the conversation. Which we will do, in a way soon to be announced.
If you are interested in hosting an Asteroids Club dinner yourself, please visit: www.AsteroidsClub.org
Jon Haidt
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Why I think Sam Harris is wrong about morality
Several commenters have said I should not just critique the excessive certainty of the New Atheists. I should respond directly to Sam Harris’s Moral Landscape Challenge. I should say why I think the argument he makes about a science of morality are wrong. (Harris argues that what is right and wrong can be determined scientifically, just as we can determine truths in the natural sciences). Fair enough. So this morning I submitted the following text as my entry in his challenge.
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I see two principles errors in The Moral Landscape.
1) The claim that well-being can be measured in an objective way that is similar to measurements in the natural sciences.
I am active in positive psychology. I believe that well-being can be measured. But there is no one measurement, and no way to aggregate measurements in a way that removes the need for philosophical discussions about what matters to people in a particular culture and era. The form of measurement Harris seems to assume is a utilitarian approach: sum up all the well-being of each person at each moment, perhaps estimating it by taking brain scans. Whatever way of life leads to the maximum objective well-being across all people is morally better than one that leads to less.
This approach to measurement is similar to the approach that Dan Kahneman took in the 1990s, when he thought that happiness was the area under the curve, when you graph out a person’s well-being from moment to moment. The more moments spent in high well-being, the better. But Kahneman eventually renounced this view, recognizing that experienced happiness is not the only criterion, and that the duration of experiences does not matter in a linear way. To give one example, which life would you rather lead:
Life #1: You have an easy life, full of intense pleasures, and you are very happy for your first 60 years. But at age 60 you take stock of your life and spend your last 20 years unhappy, with a sense that your life has been a waste.
Life #2: You work hard, have repeated failures, and are rarely happy for your first 60 years. But at age 60 your hard work finally pays off, you have great accomplishments, and you spend your last 20 years happy, with a sense that your life has been profoundly meaningful.
If we stipulate that the total well-being experienced in life #1 is twice as high as in life #2, would it then be wrong to choose life #2? According to Harris’s logic, a society that pushes people toward life #1 is morally superior to one that pushes people toward life #2. It has a higher peak on the Moral Landscape, even though most people would probably choose life #2.
There is no single metric of well-being; there is no way to eliminate the need for reflection, or for philosophers. There is no way to turn values into the sorts of non-contested facts that we find in the natural sciences, where variables of interest can be measured with no need for cultural or historical knowledge.
2) The claim that moral facts are non-anthropocentric facts.
The philosopher David Wiggins (1987) distinguishes between “Non-anthropocentric” and “anthropocentric” facts. (This is similar to Locke’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities). Facts of chemistry, physics, and other hard sciences are non-anthropocentric. They do not depend on any aspect of human nature. If intelligent aliens had come to visit the earth long before humans appeared, they would have found that the earth is the third planet from the sun, and that copper is a better conductor of electricity than is aluminum.
Anthropocentric facts, in contrast, are only true given the kinds of creatures that we happen to be, due to the twists and turns of our evolutionary history. Examples include the facts that sugar is sweeter than ascorbic acid, and that extended solitary confinement is painful. Those are not just my personal opinions; they are facts about sugar and isolation.
Harris is asserting that correct moral claims are non-anthropocentric facts. He is asserting that if intelligent aliens came to Earth today, they could in principle judge the moral worth of human societies, as long as they learned about human brains and could take accurate measures of well-being.
But moral facts are anthropocentric facts. If intelligent aliens came to visit, we can have no confidence that they would reach the same moral conclusions that Harris reaches, based on his utilitarian ethos. Perhaps these aliens evolved by cloning rather than sexual reproduction, and, like the Borg on Star Trek, are concerned only about the strength of the collective, with no concern for individuals.
Even within the category of anthropocentric truths, there are subtypes. Perceptual claims are generally (though not always) true across cultures and eras. Because of our shared evolutionary history, it will be an anthropocentric fact everywhere that sugar is sweeter than ascorbic acid. Yet many other anthropocentric facts are emergent –– they emerge only when people interact, in a particular cultural or historical era. Prices are a good example: It is a fact that gold is more valuable than silver. That is not just my opinion. Other examples include judgments of humor, sexiness, or deliciousness. Some comedians, fashion models, and restaurants really are better than others. Standards emerge at particular times, and the aggregated judgments of experts are actually ratings of quality. There are facts, but they are very different from the facts of chemistry and physics. We might call such facts “emergent culture-specific anthropocentric truths.”
I believe that moral truths are of this sort. This still makes it possible to critique practices in other cultures. All cuisines are not equal – French cuisine was better than 1950s American, and Julia Child offered Americans a way to improve. Similarly, a culture that oppresses categories of people against their will is worse than one that does not. Massive human rights violations, in which large numbers of victims are crying out for foreign assistance, can justify a military response from other nations. But the fact that humanity has reached that point is an emergent fact about modernity and our changing moral standards. I do not think it was morally incumbent upon ancient Rome to stop human rights abuses in neighboring kingdoms. Moral facts are not eternal and universal in the way that non-anthropocentric facts are. But if moral facts are unlike facts in the natural sciences, then Harris’s attempt to collapse the fact/value distinction fails.
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The Righteous Mind Challenge
In a recent essay in the evolutionary magazine This View of Life, I analyzed Sam Harris’s Moral Landscape Challenge, in which he offers to pay $10,000 to anyone who can convince him to change his mind and renounce his views. From the perspective of The Righteous Mind, it seems unlikely that anyone who is heavily invested in an idea, and who writes about it with high levels of certainty, can be persuaded to change merely by the force of an essay words written by a stranger. So I offered to pay Harris $10,000 if he changes his mind.
Please read that essay first. This blog entry just gives lots of additional details, particularly about the word-count analyses. I’ll update this entry as people ask me additional questions.
I) How did I choose books to analyze?
I started by analyzing the three big New Atheist books: The God Delusion, The End of Faith, and Breaking the Spell. I then chose 3 recent books that were written by scientists who seem focused on explaining religion, not condemning it. I chose my own book, plus the two books that I knew about which came out shortly after mine, on the origins and psychology of religion: Jesse Bering’s The Belief Instinct, and Ara Norenzayan’s Big Gods. (I also examined some older books, to be confident that I wasn’t cherry picking, and they too were almost all below 1.6, so I just picked the 3 most recent of all the books I analyzed.) To pick the right-wing writers, I chose three of the most prominent, and then went onto Amazon to see which of their books was the most reviewed, which I took as a proxy for most read, or more influential. That led me to Glenn Beck’s Common Sense, Sean Hannity’s Deliver us from Evil, and Ann Coulter’s Treason. But here too, I analyzed a bunch of other books by these and other authors, and found that they typically fell in the middle range, between 1.4 and 1.7. [see below, in section III-B]
II) How did I do the analyses?
I obtained plain text files of all the books (I also bought Kindle versions of all the books, to ensure that the authors would get the royalties they deserve). I checked the text files carefully to make sure there were no issues that would skew the word count, such as headers that repeated on every page. I stripped out all the front-matter before the first word of the main text, and all the end-matter after the last chapter. I kept in introductions and epilogues, but cut out acknowledgments, notes, appendices, and references. I then ran each text file through LIWC, using the built-in 2007 dictionary, outputting the Certain category. Here are all the words that LIWC scores when computing its “certain” score:
absolute, absolutely, accura*, all, altogether, always, apparent, assur*, blatant*, certain*, clear, clearly, commit, commitment*, commits, committ*, complete, completed, completely, completes, confidence, confident, confidently, correct*, defined, definite, definitely, definitive*, directly, distinct*, entire*, essential, ever, every, everybod*, everything*, evident*, exact*, explicit*, extremely, fact, facts, factual*, forever, frankly, fundamental, fundamentalis*, fundamentally, fundamentals, guarant*, implicit*, indeed, inevitab*, infallib*, invariab*, irrefu*, must, mustnt, must’nt, mustn’t, mustve, must’ve, necessar*, never, obvious*, perfect*, positiv*, precis*, proof, prove*, pure*, sure*, total, totally, true, truest, truly, truth*, unambigu*, undeniab*, undoubt*, unquestion*, wholly
III) What are the actual mean scores?
A) Here are the original results I posted.
Author |
Title |
LIWC Certain score |
Harris | The End of Faith | 2.24 |
Dennett | Breaking the Spell | 1.77 |
Dawkins | The God Delusion | 1.7 |
Beck | Common Sense | 1.56 |
Hannity | Deliver us from Evil | 1.49 |
Coulter | Treason | 1.49 |
Bering | Belief Instinct | 1.56 |
Norenzayan | Big Gods | 1.2 |
Haidt | Righteous Mind | 1.15 |
Note that there are no standard deviations, and no error bars on the graph, because these numbers are not samples from a larger population. They are the exact measurement done on the total population of words in each book.
B) Analyses of additional books [added on 3/3/14]:
Rahul in the comments asked me to post analyses of some other random works, e.g., from Gutenberg.org, to give us more context within which to interpret the certainty scores I posted. I agreed that this was a good idea, and asked him to pick some texts from Gutenberg, ideally works of relatively modern non-fiction. Rahul obliged, and provided this list. I show each work with its LIWC certainty score in parentheses: Darwin: On the Origin of Species (2.04); United States Presidents’ Inaugural Speeches: From Washington to George W. Bush (2.18); Gandhi: My Experiments with Truth (1.68); Speeches & Letters of Abraham Lincoln (2.05); Albert Einstein: The Meaning of Relativity (1.81); Works of Martin Luther (2.26); G. K. Chesterton “Orthodoxy” (2.85). I was surprised to find a relatively high score for The Origin of Species, which did not fit with my general sense of Darwin’s careful writing. So I added in all of his other books, which turned out to score quite low on certainty: Darwin: Descent of Man (1.43); Darwin: Expression of emotions (1.32); Darwin: Voyage of the Beagle (1.31), so Darwin’s average certainty score across his four books was 1.52 . I do grant that there is variation within each author, depending on the writing task at hand. Ideally, one would analyze multiple books from each author.
To put this all together, I provide below the LIWC certainty scores of all the books I have now analyzed, including the 9 I presented in my original essay; the 7 suggested by Rahul, plus Darwin’s others; the right wing authors I did not show in my original analysis (e.g., Rush Limbaugh, Bill O’Reilly, Michael Savage, and Mark Levin); and two older books on religion by non-new-atheists (David Sloan Wilson and Scott Atran). I sort the table by declining avg score for each author, given that I have more than 1 work for 6 of the authors.
Work analyzed in LIWC | Avg certainty for each author | Certainty score for each book | |
chesterton.orthodoxy | 2.85 | 2.85 | |
HARRIS AVG | 2.3 | ||
harris.end of faith | 2.24 | ||
harris.The Moral Landscape | 2.37 | ||
luther.works of martin luther | 2.26 | 2.26 | |
us.presidents.inaugural.speeches | 2.18 | 2.18 | |
lincoln.speeches and letters | 2.05 | 2.05 | |
einstein.the meaning of relativity | 1.81 | 1.81 | |
dennett.breaking the spell | 1.77 | 1.77 | |
dawkins.god delusion | 1.7 | 1.7 | |
gandhi.my experiments with truth | 1.68 | 1.68 | |
beck.common sense [right wing] | 1.66 | 1.66 | |
wilson.darwins cathedral [not a new atheist] | 1.65 | 1.65 | |
limbaugh.the way things ought to be [right wing] | 1.64 | 1.64 | |
O’REILLY AVG [right wing] | 1.59 | ||
oreilly.culture-warrior | 1.59 | ||
OReilly.whos_looking_out_for_you | 1.6 | ||
bering.the belief instinct | 1.56 | 1.56 | |
COULTER AVG [right wing] | 1.56 | ||
coulter.godless | 1.63 | ||
coulter.treason | 1.49 | ||
HANNITY AVG [right wing] | 1.53 | ||
hannity.deliver us from evil | 1.49 | ||
hannity.let freedom ring | 1.57 | ||
DARWIN AVG | 1.52 | ||
Darwin.descent_of_man | 1.43 | ||
Darwin.expression_of_emotion | 1.32 | ||
darwin.on the origin of species | 2.04 | ||
Darwin.voyage_of_the_beagle | 1.31 | ||
atran.in gods we trust [not a new atheist] | 1.43 | 1.43 | |
savage.liberalism is a mental disorder [right wing] | 1.43 | 1.43 | |
levin.liberty and tyranny [right wing] | 1.41 | 1.41 | |
HAIDT AVG | 1.25 | ||
haidt.happiness-hypothesis | 1.36 | ||
Haidt.Righteous-Mind | 1.15 | ||
Norenzayan.Big Gods | 1.21 | 1.21 |
IV) Miscellaneous Methodological Issues
A) Some people on Twitter have pointed out a possible confound in the analyses: the LIWC certainty dictionary contains roots like funtamentalis* and fact. If the New Atheists are talking ABOUT religious fundamentalists, or if Harris’s book The Moral Landscape is about values as facts, its unfair to give them points for using those words. I agree, those are false positives. So I will re-run all analyses using a very restricted dictionary, which uses only the most unambiguously dogmatic words, such as “always” and “never.” I propose using this subset of the LIWC dictionary: Absolute, absolutely, always, certainly, definitely, every, inevitab*, must, necessar*, never, obvious*, totally, undeniab*, undoubt*, unquestion*. Please comment below if you think I should cut any of those words, or add back any from the full list given in section 2.
[Text added 3/3/14]: Commenter Bianluca Barbetta, below, suggested cutting “absolute.” So I did that and then re-analyzed the original 9 books (plus Moral Landscape) using the restricted dictionary listed above. The resulting numbers are much lower, of course (because many fewer words are captured), but the basic picture that emerges is little changed. In declining order, the scores are: Harris-End of faith (.47); Beck-Common Sense (.47); Harris-Moral Landscape (.46); Dennett-Breaking The Spell (.39); Dawkins-God Delusion (.38); Hannity-Let Freedom Ring (.37); Coulter-Treason (.36); Bering-Belief instinct (.30); Haidt-Righteous Mind (.21); Norenzayan-Big Gods (.15). These scores show the percentage of all words used in each book that were in the list of words coded by the dictionary. For Harris and Glenn Beck, it’s nearly a half percent of all words.
B) To get an independent check on whether the effects I report are real and robust, I hope somebody will create large text files for each author I chose, composed of, say, 20 blog post available on the internet, and then run LIWC on those files. If someone does that, i”ll post a link to the results here.
C) [added on 2/18/14]: Many of the critical commenters below note that there are many ways of using words like “certain” or “certainly” which don’t indicate anything about the mindset of the author. They are right. LIWC is a simple word count program; it does not analyze words in context, and it does not control for negation (e.g., “it is not certain that…”). So there are many false positives. A LIWC does not by itself prove that the new atheists are more dogmatic than other groups of authors. But it can test one’s subjective impressions; it can add or subtract confidence in one’s impressions. When I read the New Atheist books, Dawkins and Harris sounded angry, whereas Dennett did not. But all three authors seemed to to me to use certainty formulations to an unusual degree. I then ran LIWC to measure both of those categories, and it turned out that the New Atheists were high on both (except for Dennett, who scores low on anger, confirming the impressions of many readers). But then I examined the LIWC output to see the words in context, and it was clear to me that Harris scored high on anger in large part because he is talking about violence and killing related to religion. That’s his subject matter, not his emotion. There were so many of these false positives that I decided it would not be fair or accurate to publish the anger findings. The certainty findings, however, hold up much better. Those word uses did seem to be capturing something about Harris’s prose style. In response to a commenter below, I opened up The End of Faith at random, to page 40, and found this passage:
“The basis of our spirituality surely consists in this: the range of possible human experience far exceeds the ordinary limits of our subjectivity. Clearly, some experiences can utterly transform a person’s vision of the world. Every spiritual tradition rests on the insight that how we use our attention, from moment to moment, largely determines the quality of our lives.”
Surely, clearly, and every? This is not the way most scientists write.
V) Additional Stuff:
A) Here is my entry in the Moral Landscape Challenge, where I say why I think Harris’s claims about morality are wrong.
B) [added on 2/18/14] What will it take for me to pay Harris the $10,000? I will send him a personal check (or donate to his foundation, whichever he prefers) if two conditions are met: 1) Harris pays someone the $10,000 of his own money for writing an essay that changed his views about morality, and 2) this payment is accompanied by an explicit acknowledgment that his “case for a scientific understanding of morality is mistaken,” as he puts it in the challenge itself. Harris and I both agree that a scientific understanding of how morality and moral judgment work, descriptively, is appropriate, and is proceeding well. (We both participated in an Edge.org project on The New Science of Morality). We agree that scientists can study morality just as they can study language, or sexuality, or color vision. The dispute between us arises over whether science can tell us what is in fact morally right and wrong, in the same way that science can tell us facts about the natural world. That is Harris’s most provocative and interesting claim in The Moral Landscape. If he renounces that claim, or in some other way says that his argument in The Moral Landscape was largely wrong, I’ll pay him the money. If he pays the money while admitting only a minor error, or conceding some peripheral points, that would not count as having changed his mind or accepted the refutation of his thesis.
C) [added 3/3/14] It is interesting that in Harris’s recent debate with Dennett over free will, Harris opens his rebuttal with a claim that seems on its face to support my basic argument:
The virtues of rational discourse are everywhere espoused, and yet witnessing someone relinquish a cherished opinion in real time is about as common as seeing a supernova explode overhead. The perpetual stalemate one encounters in public debates is annoying because it is so clearly the product of motivated reasoning, self-deception, and other failures of rationality—and yet we’ve grown to expect it on every topic, no matter how intelligent and well-intentioned the participants.
D) The full opening paragraph from Section I of Hume’s Enquiry, is worth reading:
DISPUTES with men, pertinaciously obstinate in their principles, are, of all others, the most irksome; except, perhaps, those with persons, entirely disingenuous, who really do not believe the opinions they defend, but engage in the controversy, from affectation, from a spirit of opposition, or from a desire of showing wit and ingenuity, superior to the rest of mankind. The same blind adherence to their own arguments is to be expected in both; the same contempt of their antagonists; and the same passionate vehemence, in inforcing sophistry and falsehood. And as reasoning is not the source, whence either disputant derives his tenets; it is in vain to expect, that any logic, which speaks not to the affections, will ever engage him to embrace sounder principles.
(Note that Hume is describing two different kinds of disputants – the pertinaciously obstinate kind, and the disingenuous kind. That is why he says “either disputant” in the last sentence. But since I’m only talking about one kind, I changed it to [such a].)
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Look how far we’ve come… apart
I have an essay in today’s NYT on America’s growing polarization. Marc Hetherington and I show what’s happened over the last 50 years, not just in Congress but among citizens, in 3 simple graphs.The first one is below, from McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal. It shows that things were really polarized in the late 19th century, after the civil war, then they got much less polarized, but it’s been a rapid climb upwards since the 1960s. We talk about why.
The next 2 graphs were made by Hetherington, and they are just as depressing. Click here to read the essay.
But we end on an optimistic note. There really are so many changes we could make to roll things back, perhaps to the level of polarization in the 1990s, which was much lower than it is today. But only if we push our leaders to make the changes. They will not make the changes themselves, because each change will probably favor one side or the other, so the disadvantaged side will fight like hell. But extreme pressure from outside, for a comprehensive package of reforms — a kind of good-government-Simpson-Bowles — might do it.
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Post-script: see Pete Ditto’s call for “domestic realpolitik” to be realistic about how we’re going to get things done.
Read MoreMoral psychology and the campaigns (on “The Cycle”)
I was a guest today on a new MSNBC show, The Cycle, which is interesting because it features one conservative and three liberals discussing the days issues in a friendly way — I love it every time I see models of cross-partisan amity and constructive disagreement.
We talked about the role that moral values play in the campaigns. The hosts wanted to talk about what makes swing voters decide, but I preferred to talk about what energizes the bases. We haven’t had an election where both sides aimed for the middle since 2000, when George W. Bush ran as a moderate compassionate conservative.
[Forgive my big speech error of saying “right” once when I clearly meant “left.”]
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